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ABSTRACT
The results of this feasibility study are summarized here in abstracted
conclusions. The basis for, and proof of the validity of these conclusions
are developed in the body of the report..
1, Based on prediction success with an interim approximate model
for LSI prediction as contained in the Hughes R-67-3 "Designers
Reliability Handbook", and with preliminary examples herein of a
new basic prediction method it is considered feasible to develop
more accurate LSI prediction models of the new advanced type.
2. These conclusions are based on a detailed study of part and present
..
prediction modeling efforts and potential improvements described
herein that can logically follow the advanced modeling achieve-
ments also described. Guidelines and tools for the generation and
validation of practical more accurate prediction models have been
developed. These include:
• An under standing of the original state of defects in raw
materials and their meaning for reliability.
• The impact of manufacturing processes and workmanship
errors on the content of defects of various types that control
failure mode distributions and failure rates.
• Improved ability to spec ify and perform tests and screens to
remove defects and prevent failures.
• The interaction effects of applied stresses with time that
determine demonstrated reliability during any stress interval.
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• The definition of failure mode and mechanism families and
the relation of these to microcircuit life cycle history.
• The definition of other key factors and their interrelationships
that are explained by several series of supporting models.
• A body of new modeling theory that enables the construction of
practical engineering-type mathematical models.
• The analysis and understanding of reliability cause and effect
as these relate to the design and manufacture of reliable LSI
microcircuits.
3. Past failures in the field of prediction were analyzed. Errors in
past philosophy and approach were discovered, and not only were
the methods of modeling most likely to be successful identified but
pitfalls to be avoided were revealed.
4. This study included analysis of large scale hybrid arrays and fully
integrated monolithic LSI microcircuits. It is believed that the
proposed new models can apply effectively to both types of LSI
and also to the new Extra !:arge ~cale .!.ntegrated (ELSI)
microc ircuits.
5. Preliminary or interim type LSI prediction rnodels have been
used successfully for several years by the Hughes Aircraft Corn-
pany on large systern programs. This experience provides data
and direction for the next effort of developing the propo sed rnore
accurate basic type prediction rnodels. The presently used LSI
prediction technique is expla ined herein. In appendix Bare
procedural sheets for making hybrid LSI predictions that are
photographically reproduced frorn the Hughes Designers Reliability
Handboo k R- 6 7- 3. Sirni lar excerpts could have been shown for
totally monolithic LSI rnicrocircuits. In general these are simpler
techniques that can take advantage of the greater standardization
that has been achieved in rnonolithic LSI's
6. It is believed that the feasibility of the proposed new models is
dernonstrated by the surprising accuracy of prediction dernonstrated
on the F -14-XN3 systern. The conventional handbook approac h
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such as the interiIn model method in appendix B can only predict
the height of the bottom of the "Reliability Bathtub" failure rate
curve. This prediction was ABB = 0.28% per thousand hours for
the several hundred hybrid LSI micro circuits involved. Actual
flight and field service data indicates a decreasing failure rate
with time that has slightly surpassed this predicted value at the
end of 4,600 hours. During the first 1,600 hours of operating
life the average failure rate was A1600 = 2. 0% per thousand hours.
During the following 3, 000 hour s the average failure rate was
A3000 = 0.24% per thousand hours. The feasibility of the proposed
more accurate basic models is demonstrated by the application
example using many preliminary and assumed parameter values.
The new basic models have the advantage that they can predict
failure rates at any time interval even before the bottom of the
"Bathtub" has been reached. With these models there is no need
to assume that a constant failure rate exists. Even with the
approximate parameters used, the new basic model approach pre-
dicted a Al = o. 36% per thousand hours for the first thousand hour s
of life and A2 = O. 10% per thousand hours for the second thousand
hours of life. Many approximations and preliminary hypotheses
used herein to demonstrate the practical feasibility of the proposed
new models, should be refined and perfected in the next stage of
deve lopmen t.
7. Reasons for failure of past prediction efforts have been explained
in a study of seven schools of thought on hybrid reliability prediction.
Errors in approach, technique, or interpretation of results from
these seven schools have been analyzed" and their better features
ha ve been harmonized with actual data in a propo sed improved pre-
diction approach. Each of the seven schools of thought contains
good facets of approach, theory and data that have been assessed,
interpreted, and adapted for use in developing improved models.
The distorted concepts and technical bias in these schools of thought
have also been identified and categorized for future avoidance in
modeling efforts.
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8. In the proces s of studying the feasibility of developing practical
hybrid reliability prediction models, two other aspects of feasi-
bility became apparent. These two related "needs" require
development for NASA use of the type demonstrated in the success-
ful use of the Hughes Interim Hybrid prediction technique. The
other two needs are described below:
a. Methods and procedures for making the most effective use of
the new prediction models. (On programs of various types
with different urgencies., complexity, time and cost constraints
key reliability problems and application stress conditions --
these pro grams are in different stages of development and
reliability achievement at the times that the models are
applied. )
b. Guidelines and pedagogical material with which to implement
training and indoctrination for the most succes sful use of the
new models, techniques, methods, and procedures. (For
training under various conditions and program exigencies, of
people with different technical orientation, in various levels of
organizational authority, responsibility and industrial discipline
such as line management, service functions, quality control,
reliability engineering, product design, production planning,
and Government assurance, etc.)
9. Even a casual study of the literature reveals many discrepancies
and apparent contradictions in published failure data and failure
mode distributions for LSI microcircuits. These discrepant data
can be explained and made use of in developing and applying practi-
cal reliability prediction models. Even the prediction approache s
which have failed can be interpreted for valuable lessons learned
that will be helpful in the proposed next stage of modeling effort.
Most available failure mode data, for example, are meaningless for
future predic,tion unless the detailed results (not the conclusions)
are interpreted according to newly established laws of failure,
principles of screening, methods of prediction, and concepts of
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time- stress-detection interdependency. These technical tools are
now developed for immed iate application.
10. Failure mode distributions (Pie Charts) that appear in the lit'era-
ture as computed from data applying at some time or stage of
system manufacture and use, have been found to relate to many
cumulative factors of the past that are not usually presented with
the pie charts. These missing background facts include the
maturity of the design, the factory and process controls that were
used, the nature of the system and its complexity, the amount of
screening that has preceded the applicable milestone at which the
distribution is computed, and the total past stress history in
manufacture, test and use. All these factors are defined, they
can now be measured in practical terms, and they are interrelated
in one or more of the eight series of basic math models recently
developed at Hughes Aircraft Company by these same authors.
These new models provide a basis for understanding the inter-
action effects of stresses with time and man-machine interfaces
with the process and final product characteristics. In general the
present model coverage is of defect generation, detection, and
control in preparation for delivering known reliable systems at
the optimum lowest cost. These models are a natural springboard
from which to develop the proposed new basic models for qybrid
reliability prediction. It has been found that most of the informa-
tion needed in any given case for this kind of prediction is already
measured and recorded in existing program records lacking only
guidance in its extraction and summary in specific form for its
immediate understanding and use.
11. Accurate failure rate predictions and quantities of failures to be
expected during specific subsequent stress intervals can be com-
puted from known and presently recorded failure mode and time-
stress conditions. Demonstration tests, storage and logistic
support intervals, or special mission use periods are the future
time - stres s intervals for which predictions can be made. The
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models to be. developed represent simplified technical tools that
are validated extensions of present useable techniques and models.
12. By the proposed modeling approach, when any of the essential
key factors are not known initially, they can be approximated in
various ways with a known impact on the accuracy of the final
predictions. For example, on any program where reliability
predictions are started at interim states of project completion,
a-priori approximate estimates of the key factors can be established
for making preliminary predictions. Later these can be refined
for greater accuracy as subsequent program information of a more
definitive nature becomes available. Specific steps to develop,
validate and verify these new models are described in the recom-
mendations section V.
viii
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1. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this program. was to determ.ine the feasibility of
developing practical reliability prediction m.odels that can be used to estim.ate
the reliability of space system.s utilizing Large Scale Integration (LSI) m.icro-
circuits. The conclusion reached is that it is feasible to generate and use such
m.odels successfully. This conclusion is based on a study of past and present
prediction m.odeling effo rts and potential im.provem.ents that can logically
follow the present advanced developm.ents in this field.
Not all of the conclusions reached in this study can be substantiated with
equal rigor. Those relating to successfully accom.plished prediction efforts
can be validated by reference to the achieved facts. This is only possible in
the past tense and for the lim.ited use of large scale hybrid arrays that can
be cited for the pa st.
Conclusions based on efforts in the past that were not succe ssful in
achieving their intended objectives are not so easily substantiated, but these
are non- the-les s real and valid. Past failures can be interpreted if reasons
for failure are known as well as the re sults that would have occurred if
certain change s in approach or technique had been applied. This knowledge
is always acquired after the unsuccessful events and thus is never included
with the failure record. Frequently the m.ost valuable lessons learned from.
any pa st incident can never be learned directly from. the im.m.ediate recorded
history. Adjacent history and subsequent interpretations of results m.ust be
assessed before the real achievem.ents of each failure becom.e apparent. For
exaITlple, the final construction of the first successful electric incondescent
laITlp depended on the interpretation of the reasons for failure of all the pre-
vious unsuccessful atteITlpts. Without the previous failures the final success
would not have been possible.
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The feasibility of hybrid LSI reliability prediction has sim.ilar
qualifications. Som.e success with prelim.inary hybrid prediction m.odels can
be cited. But m.ost of the prediction and m.odeling success in the past has
not been directly related to hybrid LSI prediction. Most of the LSI approaches
in the literature representing som.e seven schools of thought in reliability have
either been tried by som.eone with only partial success, or would have been
proven unsuccessful had they been tried, largely because of inherent weak-
nesses in the approach or proposed m.ethods of application. A m.ajor weakness
of m.ost techniques and m.athem.atical m.odels for prediction is their com.-
plexity which m.akes them. too cum.bersom.e for practical application•.
Thus, although not enough proof data to be considered statistically valid
can be subm.itted proving that highly accurate hybrid LSI prediction m.odels are
feasible, there is m.uch evidence that they will be feasible when they are
properly developed and applied using recently proven principles and techniques.
Em.phasis he re is on both the principles of developm.ent and the principles of
of successful application after they are developed and validated. As with any
sharp tool the inexperienced user can injure him.sel£, dam.age the individual
tool, and by ineffective use give the whole class of sim.ilar tools a bad nam.e.
This is the source of som.e negative feeling in the past about reliability pre-
diction in general, and points up the need for advanced training and indoc-
trinal efforts for the successful application of the new prediction m.odels after
they becom.e developed. This threefold set of feasibility factors can be
illus trated as in Table I.
Based on specific results from. this feasibility study and previous
achievem.ents in sim.ilar m.odeling efforts by the authors of this report, the
achievem.ent of success with all three feasibility factors of Table I is
adjudged feasible. It is fortunate to be able to report that prelim.inary
type hybrid LSI prediction m.odels have been used successfully at Hughes
for the past several years. Not only were the m.odels developed but
official approval for their use on m.ajor program.s was established; people
were indoctrinated in their specific application, and results from. their
successful use are available for the next step of developing m.ore accurate
m.odels. In addition num.erous conclusions can be cited from. this feasibility
study that supplem.ent and augm.ent the confidence of this analysis team.
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TABLE 1. MAJOR FEASIBILITY FACTORS
A. Develop and Verify More Accurate Hybrid LSI Prediction Models and
Techn iques based on past and present evidence.
B. Develop Methods and Detailed Procedures:
• For making the most effective use of the new prediction models
• On programs of various types with different complexity, inherent
rei iabil ity, time and cost constraints, program objectives, and
demonstration or appl ication stress conditions
• For programs that are in different stages of development and
reliability achievement at the times that the models are to be
appl ied
c. Establish Guidelines and Training Material:
• To implement worker and management training and inductrination
programs
• For the most successful and cost effective appl ication of the
models, techniques, methods and procedures
• Under various conditions and program exigencies
• By people with different technical orientation and perspective
• In various levels of organizational authority and industrial
discipline such as line management, quality control,
reliabil ity engineering, product design, production planning,
Government Assurance, etc.
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that successful achievement of more accurate prediction models for use with
large scale hybrid arrays is but a short step away.
Although this project was originally aimed at large scale hybrid LSI
mic rocircuits. the question can be raised of applicability of the models to
fully monolithic LSI's. This question is important because of the current
trend toward use of an increasingly greater proportion of monolithic elements
in hybrid arrays. This trend probably will continue so that future extra
large scale microcircuits (ELSI) are likely to consist largely of inter-
connected monolithic LSI chips. No special challenge will be posed to the
feasibility of valid prediction models as described in this report. It repre-
sents merely a change of emphas is in computation from the hybrid functions
to the monolithic functions all of which will be included in the proposed LSI
models.
All types of problems inherent inmonolithicIC'sare COITnnonto large
scale hybrid arrays. This feasibility study has included a thorough literature
search for concepts, approaches, methods of prediction, and specific data
conce rning failures of both hybrid and monolithic integrated circuits. This
report summarizes results from this study and describes guidelines for
understanding and interpreting past prediction results as they relate to
Hybrid and Monolithic LSI in providing for such factors as IC design, system
application, use requirements, manufacturing, process and quality control,
testing, screening, reliability demonstration, final field use, and total cost
effectiveness. All these factors must be considered for successful prediction
and can be given feasible coverage in the next generation of LSI prediction
models.
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II. SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT IN PREDICTION
This feasibility study has revealed the philosophy and approach inherent
m seven different schools of thought on LSI reliability prediction. Each
school has merit from a given limited perspective which, when understood,
explains many otherwise perplexing anomalies and apparent mysteries. A
knowledge of the basic approaches taken by each school is necessary for
understanding much of the data and technical arguments in the literature
that commonly seem contradictory or irrelevant. In addition many contri-
butions from all seven schools can be used in developing the most successful
final prediction approach.
Each of the seven schools of thought has been analyzed for its reasons
in being, the validity of assumptions made, and for bias or error that
might have entered into each specific interpretation of data. In the following
discussion a few practitioners are cited in each school so that reference to
their published papers can explain the school. The lists are neither all-
inclusive or exclusive and contain the names of only a few outstanding prac-
titioners of each philosophical approach. Many others could be listed for
each school in a more complete history. In addition it should be emphas ized
that some practitioners are personal believers and sometimes professionally
active in more than one school. It is believed that each philosophy and its
resultant technical approach can make an understandable contribution when
it is properly integrated into the whole philosophical picture of LSI prediction.
In simplified perspective the seven significantly different schools of
thought on LSI reliability prediction can be characterized by the following titles:
1. Gross Statistics School
2. Failure R ate per Function School
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3. Purest Reliability Physics School
4. Failure Mode Confidence School
5. False Categorization School
6. Complexity Independence School
7. Failure Rate per Identifiable Physical Unit School
Most of these schools lead to impractical LSI prediction methods because
they fail to recognize that LSI 1 s are essentially complex systems in miniature.
Without this recognition the essential differences between systems which result
from their complexity, multiple functional capability, and intrasystem inter-
actions lose definition. With this loss, the impact of these factors on
reliability cannot be estimated.
Sometimes because the individual practitioners recognize the need for
integrating several schools of thought, but more often because of loose
thinking, the total philosophic approach is made more difficult by the widely
individualistic characteristics of the operators in each school. The same
arguments are sometimes used by different individuals as justification for
completely contradictory actions and interpretations of re suIts.
One common operating characteristic of many individuals is to focus on
a small piece of knowledge and run with it as a sole guide until impact is made
with a firm barrier. At this point the most common tendency is to drop that
particular piece of knowledge and start running in another direction with
another piece. Repeated similar futile exercises have resulted in such
derogatory epitaphs as !'Numbers Racket!!, etc. No attempt is made herein
to deal with all these foibles and inefficiencies. Rather an understanding of
the basic schools of thought is attempted for interpreting their experience.
The hungry man considers all things beneficial which move him closer
to his intended dinner. If in the process of moving closer his actions may
block someone else from moving in, this is understandable in the framework
of group activity. A minor block from an individual standpoint does not alter
the average trend for everyone to eat during certain lunch hours. The subject
of LSI reliability prediction has characteristics similar to this cafeteria
example. Various paths to essentially the same end are frequently blocked
temporarily by a combination of circumstances or approach. Unfortunately in
many reliability cases a minor temporary block has been misinterpreted to be a
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permanently closed path, and the interrupted one turns around and goes out
hungry. Lack of overall perspective has caused many prediction results to
appear as anomalies when in truth they have been but a short step from major
progress. Many basic objectives and techniques of the seven schools of
thought in prediction are not greatly different and can be coordinated for
mutual advantage. Better understanding and improved application of methods
can result from a study of the seven basic schools of thought. When the
strengths and weaknesses of these various schools of thought and approach
are understood and appreciated, the feasibility of developing successful hybrid
reliability prediction models becomes obvious. The seven unique schools of
thought are described in the remainder of this section.
A. GROSS STA TISTICS SCHOOL
The gross statistics school uses the approach that ignores design details
and random defects, puts major emphasis on failures resulting from gross
quality defects caused by process error, and does not recognize the key role
or impact of reliability screening. Perhaps the major proponent of this school
of thought is the RADC - RAC - IIT (Reliability Analysis Cente r sponsored by
RADC at Illinois Institute of Technology). 1
B. FAILURE RATE PER FUNCTION SCHOOL
The failure rate per function school emphasizes failure rate per func-
tion accomplished, rather than failure rate per chip or per package and con-
centrates on failure statistics and detailed analysis of failure mechanisms
without direct application of the mechanism models to practical reliability
prediction models. Two key proponents in this school are G. L. Schnable2
and R. S. Keen of Philco-Ford.
C. PUREST RELlA BILITY PHYSICS SCHOOL
The purest reliability physics school is concerned with studies in depth
on causes of failure and failure mechanisms with emphasis on effective cor-
rective and preventive action. This school concentrates on techniques of
analysis and related instrumentation with little regard for practical applica-
tions in prediction. The concept of this school seems to be, "Understand
the cause and prevent the reoccurance. Once a solution is found the basic
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problem is no longer considered a factor in prediction. II Chief proponents
in this school include James Black3 and Elliot Philofsky4 of Motorola and
G. V. BrowningS of McDonnell Douglas Astronautics.
D. FAILURE MODE CONFIDENCE SCHOOL
The failure mode confidence school has proposed that direct correla-
tion can be established between failure modes, manufacturer's variable factor,
and human variability in operation and use. This basic concept is to obtain
statistical confidence on the contribution to failure of each likely failure mode
as a function of time. Presumably by determining the rate of propagation of a
degradation mechanism in one device design, the findings can be extended
to another design employing the same or similar materials, geometries, and
manufacturing processes. This idea is a step in the right direction but
without the application of suitable screening theory is impractical especially
at this stage of non-standardization in design, topology, process control,
material application, complexity, packaging, etc. Leading proponents in
this school are D. 1. Troxel and B. Tiger 6 of RCA and J. Partridge7 of MIT
Instrumentation Laboratory.
E. FALSE CATEGORIZATION SCHOOL
Several promising programs for der iving prediction information from
extensive controlled testing have bogged down in misunderstanding and false
categorization of test results. One such program developed much good test
data for the Air Force by using unscreened parts that unfortunately resulted
in multimodal data. Without recognizing the time character of the data and
real lessons that could be learned, misleading conclusions were drawn. Four
false categories of failure were devised to explain the apparently anomalous
data. These categories were entitled:
1. "Time Dependent Process Failures
2. Mechanically Dependent Processes
3. Serial Effects
4. Parts that Never Worked (Escapes). 11
When the description of these categories given by the authors are studied, it
becomes obvious that too much unrelated information is included. Nearly all
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these categories are overlapping in several ways. For example, "Loss of
Metal Adhesion'l is listed as an instant effect under the category of Mechani-
cally Dependent Processes. Usually this is a fatigue effect that is very
time dependent and frequently serial in nature. Thus this one mode could
rightfully be listed in three of the four categories. Many of the other items
listed under "Instant Effects 'l are also highly time dependent. Part of the
confusion apparently stems from lack of discrimination between methods of
detecting final modes of failure and the nature of mechanism leading up to
failure. Other examples of false categorization are the listing of "Mechanical
Separation of Bonds" under IISerial Effects Category" and "Separation of
Bonds" under "Instant Mechanically Dependent Processes Category. II It is
significant that when the authors try to utilize these false categories in modeling
their test results, they abandon their theory and resort to a purely empirical
reliability model which is a logical extension of the RADC Reliability Notebook
version of the Hughes Type 1 interim models. Leading proponents in this
school include D. C. Porter and W. A. Finke S of Boeing Aerospace Division.
F. COMPLEXITY INDEPENDENCE SCHOOL
From the observation that integrated circuit failure rates approach those
of similarly screened simple semiconductors, the complexity independence
school has derived a hypothesis of failure dependence between similar sys-
tem elements exposed to certain critical environments. The degree of
dependence is a function of the ratio of the variance in element strength to
the variance in applied stres s such that, if the latter is large compared to
the former, system failure probability approaches that of a single element.
In other words, functional or proces s complexity do es not influence the
reliability level. Therefore, it is concluded that once design, process con-
trols, and screening procedures reach maturity, LSI chip reliability levels,
exclusive of the package, will approach those of simple integrated circuits.
Leading proponents of this school are A. M. Briepohl9 of Sandia Corporation
and B. E. Zimmerman 10 of Texas Instruments.
The large element of truth in this approach hinges for its immediate
practicality around the phrase "once design, process controls, and screening
procedures reach maturity." During the long interim before this statement
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is likely to becom.e true for large scale LSI arrays, suitable prediction
procedures are needed that will be based on com.plexity of design and m.anu-
o
facturing factors including screening status that m.arkedly effect th~ proba-
bility of failure under any given set of stress and application conditions. It
is not feasible at this tim.e or in any early future period to m.ake these
sim.plifying assum.ptions. To do so oversim.plifies the problem. to an
im.practical state.
G. FAILURE RATES PER IDENTIFIABLE PHYSICAL UNIT SCHOOL
The failure rates per identifiable physical unit school believes that
failure rates for identifiable failure m.odes can be nornlalized to som.e identi-
fiable physical unit such as failures per bond. For hybrid LSI prediction
this approach quantifies the effects of each failure m.ode active within each
elem.ent of the m.icrocircuit.
Certain elem.ents m.ay have a single predonlinant nlode that deternlines
its failure rate while others nlay have several contributing nlodes. Also, the
relative contribution of each nlode nlay change with the type of stress and its
severity level.
In practice, a reliability prediction by this nlethod beconles an engineering
study of the paper design of the LSI, its nlanufacturing processing, inspection
and control procedures, and screening during nlanufacture, plus details of the
anticipated end use. A substantial degree of nlature engineering judgenlent is
required to cOnlplete successfully the following nlajor steps in prediction:
1. Identify nlajor elenlents of the LSI cOnlponent such as oxide layers,
m.etallizations (covered and uncovered), vias (feedthroughs), lead
bonds, die-header bond, contact cuts, glassivation, chip, inter-
connecting leads, package, etc.
2. Quantify the nUnlber of each type of elenlent
3. Analyze thoroughly each of the elenlent types to characterize
geonletr ies, nlater ials, interface cOnlbinations, etc.
4. Deternline the potential failure nlodes for each elenlent type based
on knowledge of its physical characteristics, anticipated screening
procedures, and end use stresses of load and environnlent
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5. Estimate a failure rate for each element based on the above
stres ses and modes of failure
6. Total elemental failure rates into a combined LSI component
estimate.
The key weaknesses of this approach are in steps 4 and 5. It is very
common that false categorization of failure modes and conditions in these
steps result in an unintelligible mas s of data that requires astute engineering
judgement to reduce and interpret. Proof of the validity of the judgement
decisions is very difficult. However methods for making simplifying assump-
tions and emphasizing ba sic failure mode families make this a practical
approach school. An improved example of this approach similar to the RADC
Reliability Notebook method but updated for use with modern hybrid devices
has been used successfully at Hughes for several years. Excerpts photo-
graphically reproduced of this from Hughes R-67-3 (Designers Reliability
Handbook) are shown in Appendix B. Although this is an improved predic-
tion method, the type of models employed are classed as interim models
because they lump many application stress effects into adjustment K factors.
Further im.provements in these models to eliminate the need for K adjust-
ment factors by use of basic stress parameters and to improve the methods
of steps 4 and 5 give promise of feasibility sought by this project. Major
proponents in this school have been L. D. Davis, 11 M. F. Adam, 12 and
D. M. Aaron 12 of North American Rockwell Autonetics Division and
C. M. Ryerson 13 of Hughes Aircraft Company. This report contains concepts
and proposals which are an advanced form of this school.
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III. DATA REVIEW AND SUMMARY
A. SOURCES AND AMOUNT OF DA TA
A ITlajor collection of ITlicrocircuit failure inforITlation has been cOITlpiled
for the Air Force (RADC) by the Reliability Analysis Center (RAC) of the
.!.llinois Institute of Technology (IIT). The code syITlbol for this source herein
is RAC-IIT. Various classes of technology are represented by ITlore than
20 billion device hours of ITlicrocircuit failure data. The bulk of this applies
to the Bipolar, Junction Isolation Clas s IC' s. Ana lysis and interpretations
of this data are sUITlITlarized in this section.
A second ITlajor source of data analyzed in this report is ITlore than
5 billion part hours of ITlicrocircuit failure data unpublished by Hughes Air-
craft COITlpany. Much of this data are for hybrid LSI devices.
A third source of ITlany billion part hours consists of direct reports
froITl suppliers and users of ITlicrocircuits. SOITle of this inforITlation ITlay
already be included in the RAC-IIT data. An advantage of this direct infor-
ITlation is that ITlore detail of the part application, failure conditions, and
failure ITlechanisITls are given.
The fourth source of data with billions of part hours is the Navy
FARADA data that give very little inforITlation about the failures or their
mechanisITls. Since ITlany of the largest sources of data are Air Force
reports, it is believed that ITlost of this inforITlation is duplicated in the
RAC-IIT sUITlITlaries.
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B. ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS
1. General
Although much overlap is evident in the data from various data sources
the source summaries and presentations are helpful in drawing various con-
clusions not affected by the overlap or which may benefit from it. I!'or example
the bulk of the RAC-IIT data applies to the Bipolar, Junction Isolation Class.
Because of the overlap in data sources, this statem.ent is probably accurate
for LSI data in general. Other valid conclusions can also be made as explained
in the following sections. Em.phasis in the following discus sion is on the
general conclusions and not on the specific sources used. In fact, the
m.ost valuable conclusions could have been derived from. data having sufficient
detail from. any of the sources.
2. Failure Mode Categories
One objective of this study was to analyze the rate of occurrence of
specific failure m.odes. From. the m.ass of RAC-IIT data, a total sum.m.ary
analysis was m.ade by dividing the failure m.odes into 14 categories as shown
in Table II. If the item.s for which the failure m.ode was recorded are plotted,
the distribution is as shown in Figure 1. Here it can be seen that the a 4 ,
a 3 , and c l categories are m.ajor with all the others m.aking a m.inor contribu-
tion. In term.s of a "Fie" chart this result is shown in Figure 2. Here
som.e of the categories are com.bined as shown on Table III. The data show
that the quantities of bonding and defective chip problem.s are m.inor. This
is not in line with other sim.ilar "Fie" charts which are found in the litera-
ture or which can be devised from. Hughes and other sets of data. Som.e of
these other fa ilure m.ode distributions are shown in Figures 3 through 10.
A m.ajor contribution of this feasibility study has been to explain how
differences such as these can exist in various published data and how this
understanding can be used in the future to develop practical LSI prediction
m.odels. Raw data from. the Hybrid LSI engineering facility at Hughes,
Culver City, provided the insight needed for under standing this phenom.ena.
Many thousands of hybrid devices have been m.anufactured here, and com.plete
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TABLE II. FAILURE MODE CATEGORIES
Category
Category a - Component Related
1. Short circuit
2. Intermittent
3. Mechanical Degradation
4. Electrical Degradation
Category b - Workmanship or Process Related
1. Contamination
2. Process Caused
3. Package and Seal
4. Oxide problems
5. Wire problems
6. Bonding problems
7. Die problems
Category c - Application, Use or Test Related
1. Electrical Overstress
2. Mishandling
Category d - Unknown
1. Not recorded, not specified.
Not reported, etc.
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Fraction of Fail-
ure s in pe rcent
(RAC-BP, J.1.)
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Figure 1. Bipolar, Junction Isolation, Totals
(Distribution of Specified Failure Modes)
Figure 2. RAe -IIT Total
Failure Modes (Bipolar,
Junction Isolated)
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TABLE III. COMBINED CATEGORIES OF RAC-ITT
COMMON FAILURE MODES
Table II Pie Figure 2
Category Percent Percent Percent Degrees Categoryof Total of Pie
a 1 0.33
2 0.07 4.51 23.4 84.5 Mechanical
3 4. 11
a 4 8.58 8.58 44.6 160. 1 Electrical
-
b 1 0.42
2 0.56 1. 09 5.6 20.2 Process
3 O. 11
b 4 0.60 0.97 5.0 18. 1 Chip
7 0.37
b 5 0.24 0.95 4.9 17.7 Bonding
6 0.71
c 1 2.53 Application3. 17 16.5 59.4
2 0.64 and Misuse
Totals 19.27 19.27 100 360 All
recorded
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BONDS
68%
Figure 3. IBM Solid Logic
Technology Hybrids
(System/360)
TABLE IV. 100 MILLION HOURS (MOSTLY
BURNIN AND EARLY LIFE) E. F. PLATY
Failure Percent Degrees
Bonds 68 245
Process 16 57.6
Electronic 9 116 percent 32.4
Chips 7 25. 2
Totals 100 360.2
3-6
ELEC
33%
BONDS
22%
CONTAMINATION
22%
Figure 4. MaS-LSI Burn-In
L. Hamiter (Quality
Standards for LSI)
TABLE V. MOS (HAMITER QUALITY STANDARDS)
Failure Percent Degrees
Contamination 22'.33 80
Oxide 22.33 80
Bonds 22.33 80
Electronic 33 120
Totals 100 360
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PROCESS
35%
BONDING
37%
PROCESS
47.5%
BONDING
2B%
Figure 5. System Test Figure 6. Environmental Test
TABLE VI. MINUTEMAN II IC R. E. MULFORD
TRW SYSTEMS INC.
System Test EnvironITlent Test
Category Coqe Mode Percent Degrees Percent Degrees
Electri- A ParaITleter Drift 9 } 5 } 18cal Degra- U Unknown 9 32.4 13 65dation
Process B Diffusion, Mask 7 a
etc
C Pinholes, Oxide 8 21
D Damaged Oxide 16 47.5 171 7 35 126
F ContaITlination 16.5 7
L Package Seal a a
Bonding E Bond to Terminal 4 6
G Bond to Die 3 28 101 10 37 133
H Interconnection 9 a
J Lead Bonds 12 21
Chip K Die 15.5 55.6 10 36
Total 100 360 100 360
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BONDS
24%
PROCESS
31%
CHIP
45%
Figure 7. Precap Inspection Figure 8. Post Cap Test
TABLE VII. HUGHES HYBRID MANUFACTURING
(ENGINEERING FACILITY)
Failure Pre cap Inspection Post Cap Test
Mode Percent of Degrees Percent of DegreesFailure Failure
Bonds 24 86 64.6 232.5
Chip 45 162 23.6 85
Workmanship 31 112 11.8 42.5
and Process
Totals 100 360 100 360
0/0 of Failure s
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BONDS
22%
PROCESS
8% CHIP
70%
Figure 9. A s recorded F-14. Figure 10. Harmonized F-14.
TABLE VIII. HUGHES - F-14
HYBRIDS DURING
MANUFACTURE
Figure 9 Figure 10
Failure Recorded Harmonized
Mode Percent Degrees Percent Degrees
Bonds 17.4 62.6 22 79.2
Chip 59.4 214.0 70 252.0
Workmanship 7.25 26.0 8 28.8
and Process
-
Electrical 15.95 57.4 - -
Totals 100 360 100 360
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records have been kept of each device including a detailed rework and failure
history. The cause of failure has been determined for each failure event.
A random sample of the causes of failures occurring during hybrid
LSI manufacturing reveals the pie distributions of modes as shown in Fig-
ures 7 and 8. A third pie distribution of failure modes that occurs during
subsequent manufacture of a major systern that uses rnany of these sarne
hybrids is shown in Figure 9. Because these data were not taken with this
comparison in rnind, sorne discrepancy exists in the way that failure causes
were identified. It can be seen that a .fraction of the failures attributed to
electrical degradation could have been assigned to the other three categories
as is done using best engineering judgrnent in Figure 10. The intent here
is to illustrate the principles involved and not to ernphasize the prelirninary
numbers developed in this short feasibility study. The figures used should
be considered as typical numbers derived frorn actual cases but not nec-
essarily having high statistical confidence. This can be evolved later as
the need arises to validate the pararneters of the new prediction models to
be developed. A considerably broader breakdown of failure rnodes will be
used in the final prediction models according to the needs and capabilities
described in this report. For exarnple, in these illustrations the failures
attributed to chips could actually be traced to rnultiple causes in the original
chip manufacturers plant. Thus, depending on the coverage and use of the
models, the total process and workrnanship fractions can be rnuch larger
and retained with the separate identity of direct cause frorn earliest rnaterial
assernbly to final field use.
It should be indicated that the failure rnode distribution shown in
Figure 10 is typical of rnany distributions found for hybrid rnicrocircuits at
later stages of system life. In other words the distribution change is largely
related to the irnpact of factory reliability screening. Its rneaning as
compared to reliability prediction is explained in the next section.
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3. Failure Mode Distribution Changes Explained
A major accomplishment of this feasibility study has been the insight
gained in the significance and methods for control of Failure Mode Distri-
butions. It has been indicated that the literature abounds with data that can
be illustrated in a variety of dissimilar failure mode distribution pie charts.
Most of these have little value or meaning for use in making practical
LSI predictions. It has been assumed that there should be a use for these
representations of failure mode distributions, but until now the apparently
inconsistent variability of failure mode plots from the same types of micro-
circuits has caused only confusion and uncertainty of their validity. Now it is
possible to understand and make effective use of failure mode distributions
for the prediction and control of LSI microcircuit reliability.
Several important conclusions on this subject are summarized below:
a. A major proof of the feasibility of LSI prediction models hinges
on the new ability to explain why failure mode distributions will
change from time to time and what the impact of the se variations
has on demonstrated reliability.
b. It is logical to expect changes in failure mode distributions with
time during the manufacturing and screening cycle s. The se change s
are evidence either that new failure mode s are being gene rated
(by process deficiencies or workmanship error) or that a gross
screening process is underway. Some factory intervals will involve
both phenomena. These can be measured and controlled to obtain
inherent predictable reliability.
c. Accurate reliability prediction requires that the failure mode
distribution remain constant after release of the system to use
during the interval for which the prediction is made. This factor
is controllable and depends on the stability of the product, its
design maturity, and its reliability screening status. All these
factors are now measurable, controllable, and predictable.
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d. The failure mode distribution for any system or device becomes
constant with stres s -time only when no new defects are being
generated and when a major portion of the incipient failure device s
have been removed by reliability screening. Until this desirable
maturity is achieved, any increase or change in the type of stress
can appreciably alter the failure mode distribution.
e. Each type of failure mode constitutes a subpopulation with its own
inherent resistance to detection and its own characteristic degrada-
tion from stress with time. Whenever the failure mode distri-
bution changes with applied stress-time, some failure modes are
indicated as being incited to failure by the stress at a faster time-
rate than are others. If any mode is failing at a proportionally
higher rate than others, this signifies that the items in this sub-
population are numerous and considerable reliability screening
may be required.
It is obvious that any single mode could not continue indefinite ly
to fail at a proportionally higher rate than the others. Sooner or
later in such a case the supply of incipient failures in that mode
become s exhausted or diminished to a failure rate level commen-
surate with the relative complexity of that mode in relation to the
failure chance s inherent in the de sign.
During screening the failure modes with the higher probability of
failure are removed at a high but decreasing rate. This rate
decreases rapidly until the magnitude of their detection distribution
tail flattens out and approaches a miniITluITl randoITl failure rate
for each mode. This ITlode is proportional to the stresses applied
and to the relative design complexity of the elements associated
with each mode. From this time on to the end of useful life, the
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failure mode distribution remains relatively constant as long as
the use stresses remain similar or an equivilent combination of
stres sese
f. A corollary or parallel axiom is that until the relative failure
mode distributions (Pie Plots) become unchanging with time for
a given stress load, it is proof that reliability screening has not
been completed for application at those stress levels.
g. Another axiom is that any single pie plot of failure modes for a
given microcircuit is meaningless alone. Throughout the life
history representing the manufacturing and screening periods of
the device and until the mode distribution becomes constant with
time, the distribution of failure modes will be different at each
milestone of test as a function of the relative failure probability
of the different modes.
This dependence of failure modes on their relative complexity and
pro bability of failure can be illustrated by considering two oversimplified
"ideal" cases. Consider first an ideal LSI that consists only of bonds.
If this device were practical, only one general mode of failure could be
shown on the pie chart throughout its life history. If only bonds existed then
only bonds could fail. Next extend this "ideal" concept to a hybrid consisting
of equal quantities of chips and bonds each having an equal chance of failure
from the stresses applied. Throughout the life of these simple devices the
pie plot failure mode distribution would average 50 percent bond and 50 per-
cent chip. In any normal case (not ideal), the relative probability of failure
for several modes will depend on similar factors of complexity and the sub-
population of incipient failures likely to occur with time stress and detection
in each mode. In other words the status of reliability screening at any time
and thus the relative probability of different modes occurring depends on the
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quantity of incipient defectives in each m.ode, and the ability of applied
time-stress influences to incite failure events to occur in each mode, plus
the ability of the test experiment to detect the failures when they occur.
The impact of the applied stresses on the failure mode distribution
can be illustrated by another ideal case representation. Suppose that the
real quantity of undetected failur e modes in a lot of hybrids before screen-
ing were equally assignable to three failure mode categories:
1. Bond Fa ilure,
2. Process or Workmanship Error
3. Electrical Chip Degradation.
(This example assumes higher than customary knowledge of true conditions
to make the point.) This population to be screened is divided randomly into
three equal groups, and each group is subjected to a different screening
stress.
The group subjected to short time high vibration would experience:
(1) a high percentage of bond failures, (2) few failures attributable to other
types of process or workmanship defects such as scratched conductors, and
(3) because of the short time and no electrical stress applied few or none of
the electrical degradation type. The group subjected to long time electrical
loading stresses would reverse these proportions and show a preponderance
of the electrical degradation type defect. The third group subj ected to
screening consisting of many cycles of thermal cycling from very cold to
very hot would likely show a preponderance of pro ces s and workmanship
type defects. Note that the three pie charts illustrating the failure mode
distributions for the three portions of this same lot would bear little resem-
blance to one another. In any actual case the interacting effects of probability
of failure and applied stress can cause similar variations in pie plots of
failure modes.
The third subj ect of detection efficiency is also important. Evidence
indicates that much variation in published failure mode distributions is
caused by differences between data source detection ability. Failures or
defects not detected at any early stage reduce the failure rate observable in
early time and cause a corresponding increase later when they are detected.
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In addition, at any time interval the effectivene ss of the detection
instrumentation may not be uniform for the various failure modes. Investi-
gation of these variations reveals that actual detection efficiency for any
failure mode at any time and source can vary from less than 10 to more than
90 percent.
Another factor that causes much confusion in interpretation of failure
mode distribution data is the changing definition of mode. For example, a
failure cause that is basically process or workmanship oriented in the
hybrid manufacturers plant is frequently listed as a chip defect when it
finally becomes detected in the system manufacturers or part users plant.
The definition changes as the orientation of the analyst changes.
When all these factors are considered, a reasonable expectation is that
typical trend of failure mode distribution throughout the hybrid life will change
a s shown in Figure 11. Here the actual failure mode distribution plots of
Figures 7, 8, and 10 for various stages of hybrid manufacture and use are
supplemented with other typical distributions to reveal a characte ristic life
cycle progression. The life test distribution is a summary from the RAC-IIT
data drawn intending to be typical of average characteristics during middle
periods of service life.
The characteristics of this progression shown in Figure 11 can be
observed and described as follows:
1. Poor bonds are difficult to detect visually or by simple electrical
tests at the precap stage. Thus the obvious process and chip
defects predominate in the first distribution.
2. The poor bonds not previous ly detected are caught by burn-in and
other screening tests at the postcap stage and thus predominate
in the second distribution.
3. Card Conditioning is performed after the hybrids are assembled
onto electrical circuit cards. This step catches many partially
failed bonds that escaped earlier detection plus-defects of
various kinds representing degradation caused by the assembly
operation.
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4. The m.ajor shift in distribution caused by system. m.anufacture
reflects the shift in definition that now classifies m.any defects as
chip problem.s. These problem.s m.ight have been considered pro-
cess or workm.anship error had they been detected earlier by the
hybrid m.anufacturer. In addition, the com.bined total stress tim.e
applied during the m.anufacturing and as sem.bly operation has
caused the degradation of m.any incipient but unfailed chips to
degrade to the extent that the failure incipiency is detectable.
5. The AGREE dem.onstration test com.es after m.ost gross quality
defects have been rem.oved by prior screening efforts. Thus
although the total quantity of failures is low, a large portion are
diagnosed as chip defects. These failures have escaped prior
detection but under the com.bined total tim.e- stress of m.anufacture
and dem.onstration have becom.e detectable failures.
6. By the tim.e m.ost system.s reach life test or can experience
extended life in the field, they have becom.e screened of m.ost of
their incipient early failures. As indicated earlier, system.s that
are thoroughly screened will exhibit constant failure m.ode char-
acteristics with tim.e for the stress conditions as screened. Thus
thoroughly screened sy stem.s will exhibit sim.ilar failure m.ode
distributions at subsequent 1000 or other time intervals. The
failure m.ode shown in the sixth distribution of Figure 11 that was
sum.m.arized from. RAG-IIT field failure data can be considered
typical of m.os t subsequent life test data.
4. Relating Failure Mode Distributions to Fraction Defective
Most of the m.any factors just described have been under study at Hughes
for several years. The im.pact and interaction of these factors have been
nlOdeled successfully in the developm.ent of eight series of m.odels as pre-
viously described. Without deriving any of these m.odels in this report,
som.e are used here to relate failure m.ode distributions at the various m.ile-
stones to the fraction of defectives rem.aining at any tim.e and likely to fail
under given use stresses. The previous discussion referred several tim.es to
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the incipient failures in each lot. These have been given the code symbol "q"
referring to that fraction defective in every lot this is not initially detectable
but that degrades to a detectable defective condition under the influence of
time and stre ss in manufacture, screening, te st and u~e. In addition to the se
initially undetectable defects, a fraction of the lot comprises quality defects
which though detectable have escaped detection up to the start of any tim.e
interval in the hybrid life cycle. This fraction of detectable quality defec-
tives has been given the sym.bol "0". Thus the total fraction defectives at
the start of any interval can be written as the sum. of the detectable and
incipient undetectable defects, (00 + qo).
Since defects can be generated during a factory interval by process
deficiencies or workmanship error, the peak detectable defects existing
during any interval consist of the detectable quality defects present at the
start of the interval (Qo) plus the escaped fraction of the undetectable relia-
bility defects (q~) that have become detectable during previous intervals but for
lack of 100 percent detection efficiency (D) have escaped detection, plus the
detectable quality defects generated by the workers /22,,;:,), plus the detectable
quality defects generated by the process deficiencies (8:p).
1
i. e.,
Peak (0 0 G G)
O. = Q + q + O? + OP
1 0 0 1 1
Also the peak or total undetectable reliability incipient failures existing
during the interval consists of the initial fraction of undetectable incipient
failures (~= 1) existing at the start of the interval plus the undetectable relia-
o G G
bility defects generated by the worker (qi) and the process qt' respectively.
i. e.,
Peak
q.
1
( D= 1 Gw tip)= q + q. + q.
. 0 1 1
Note that these qi defects becom.e detectable as they degrade to the
threshold of detection under the influence of stress with tim.e.
The se and other relationships existing between the initial, the peak
interval, and the final fractions remaining at the end of any stress interval can
be illustrated a s shown in Figure 12.
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PEAK
Q j PEAK 0 Gw Gp 0
...... ----- Q = (Qo + Qj + Q j + qo)
r PEAK
~ = Q j OJ (REJECTED)
o PEAK
-~= Q j (I-Oj) (DETECTABLE)
PEAK
q
UNDETECTED\
\
\
\
PEAK = 0=1 + Gw + Gp
- qj qo qj qj
r PEAK 1
qt = qj 0(1 - F) (REJECTED)
o OJ 0=1 PEAK 1
qt - qt - qt = q (1 - OJ (1 - F)
(DETECTABLE BUT UNDETEC:rED)
0=1 PEAK (2.) (UNDETECTABLE)
-qt = qj Fi
o INTERVAL -------1
Figure 12. Combined Interval with Generation
and Detection
These relationships and models have been used in this feasibility study
to relate the conditions at each of six intervals during the hybrid life cycle.
Actual reject percentages and other factors from the Hughes Hybrid manu-
facturing facility and system manufacturing experience have been used as
shown in Figure 13. From the failure mode distributions of Figure 11 and
the total failure rejects detected during each life cycle milestone the per-
centage of each lot defective in each mode was computed as shown in the
tabular data at the bottom of Figure 13. These figures cross-check realis-
tically with actual failure analyse s summarie s. They can be plotted to show
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the fraction-of-lot failure trend for each mode as in Figure 14. Notice how
parallel the curves become in later milestone zones after screening is nearly
completed.
5. Using Model Factors to Predict Reliability
Given the conditions of Figures 13 and 14, failures that would occur
in a second thousand hours of life can be predicted. The first step in
m.aking this prediction should be to consider the stress and detection
100
80
70
60 SUM
50
40
30
20
10
8
7
6
5
4
3
....
0
...J
U.
0
<Ii
'"w 1.00
0 0.8~
w 0.7
"" 0.6::>
...J 0.5:;;:
u. 0.4
0.3
0.2
0.10
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
PRECAP POSTCAP CC MFG
SUM (Q+q)
CHIPS
MISAPPLICATION
W & PROCESS
BONDS
A LIFE
(1000 hr)
Figure 14. Fraction of Lot Failure Trend
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conditions that will exist during the use time interval in question. The closer
the se can be determined by mea surement or estimation, the more accurate
the prediction will be. For illustration purposes, aSSUITle that the saITle
stress and detection conditions will apply during the second 1000-hour life
period as in the first. From this the screening strength FT2 = 1.5 and the
detection efficiency D = 0.75. On the basis that screening is now completed,
the same failure mode ratios can be assumed. The problem can be set up
for solution as in Figure 15.
0.121
} Q
o
D ~ (0. 121) (0. 75) ~ O. 09%
Q
t
~ Q
o
(1- D) ~ (0. 121) (0.25) ~ 0.03%
0.046
) 0.0115%
D ~ O. 75 ~ q (1 _ D + Q)
qt 0 F
~ (0. 046) (1 - 0.75 + ~: ~5) ~ O. 0345
THE TOTAL Q j +qj DETECTED~O.09+0.0115 ~0.10l%
THE TOTAL QUANTITY FAILING OUT OF 200 HYBRIDS ~ 0.202
THE PROBABILITY OF SYSTEM CONTAINING 200 HYBRIDS SURVIVING
SECOND 1,000 HOUR LIFE IS:
P ~ • -0.202 ~ 81.7%
s
THE HAlLURE RATE PER THOUSAND HOURS IS 0.101%/1000 HOURS
OR O. Ol FAILURES PER 106 HOURS DURING THE SECOND 1000 HOURS OF LIFE
THE FAILURE MODE DISTRIBUTION WILL BE:
FAILURE MODE PROPORTION % OF LOTREJECTED
80NDS 4.9% 0.0049
CHIPS 49.5% 0.0499
PROCESS 5.6% 0.0056
MISAPPLICATION 40.0% 0.0404
TOTALS 100% 0.101
Figure 15. Prediction ProbleITl No. 1
(Second 1000 Hour Life Period)
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A requirement might be to predict the likely failure rate during the
first one thousand hours of life if much milder application conditions were
involved. Suppose less vibration, lower temperatures and less severe ther-
mal cycling were imposed so that the screening strength over the 1000-hour
period could be computed at F T = 1. 2 instead of the original 1. 5. This1
problem can be solved and the predictions made as in Figure 16.
Comparison of this A with that from the second thousand hours of life
shows that there is a decreasing failure rate during the first few thousand
hours of life thus the assumption of a constant failure rate after the AGREE
test would be in error. Also the assumption that the failure mode distribu-
tions will be constant during the se life periods is only an approximation. The
errors caused by these assumptions are not large in many cases but to
evaluate their magnitude on each program would require a study of the type
developed on this contract. The advanced 'basic hybrid models proposed
would eliminate the need for the se as sumptions.
In both these prediction examples the solutions have been found using
assumed values of the screening strength (Fs) which can be computed from a
derived empirical fit model shown in Table IX. This model is derived in
Q
o
F = 1.2
0.47%
Q
t
= Q
o
(I-D) = (0.47) (0.25) = 0.117%
( 0.75)1 - 0.75 + IT = 0.06%
D = I D = I
qt qo 0 07
= T ="'t2- = 0.058%
THE TOTAL DETECTED AND REJECTED = (0. 35% + 0.01%) z 0.36%
THE TOTAL QUANTITY FAILING OUT OF 200 HYBRIDS = 0.72
THE PROBABILITY OF A SYSTEM CONTAINING 200 HYBRIDS
SURVIVING THIS FIRST 1,000 HOUR LIFE IS:
P = e -0.72 = 49%
,
THE A FAILURE RATE PER THOUSAND HOURS DURING THIS
FIRST 1000 HOURS OF LIFE: A = 0.36%/1000 HRS
Figure 16. Prediction Problem 2
(First 1000 Hour Life with Different
F T = 1.2)1
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TABLE IX. SCREENING STRENGTH F MODEL
s
F
Si
Where:
Pf is the probobility of failure due to temperature.T
Pf is the prababil ity of failure due to time rate of change of temperature during cycl ing.
aT
Pf is the probability of failure due to vibration.
v
And the functions ore:
=
qdT [ 1jI~ (S + S)t -A/I"E + 273]P 1-e - i T dT dT., e dT
fdT qo
qv [ -1jI~ (S + S}t e -A/I"E + 273]
= - l-e I T v v. v
qo I
qT
- - is the fraction of the total qo screenable by temperature alone
qo
IjI is the number of repetitive stress cycles
ST is the temperature stress screening constant
t is the duration time (hours) of each temperature
Sj
TS is the effective operating temperature = ITopl
A is the Arrhenius degradation constant which is a function of activation energy (v), the charge on an electron (q ), and Boltzmans
~ e
Constant k (i. e. A = k·)
qdT
- = is the fraction of the total qo screenable by thermal cycling with temperature
qo
SdT is the thermal cycling stress screening constant
is the effective cycling degradation temperature
is the duration (hours) of each time rate of change
i.e. (TE = IT -2l~rL-25 ~dt u i i
2
in °C)
is the fraction of the total qo screenable by vibration with temperature
S
v
is the vibration stress screening constant
is the effective vibration degradation temperature i.e. (TE
v
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\ Top - 25\ + 25 in OC)
Appendix A. Its use in the manner of the examples is a valid new prediction
technique. However it is believed fea sible to develop an accurate screening
strength model for each of the basic failure modes. This development would
provide for more accurate predictions without the assumption that screening
is complete and that failure mode distributions will remain constant. A
discussion of basic modeling theory in Section D introduces this proposed
development. Until this development can be completed, successful pre-
dictions can be made by using the established Hughes interim hybrid predic-
tion technique.
6. The Hughes Interim Hybrid Prediction Technique
This study has established the feasibility of developing new models and
a prediction technique for predicting hybrid reliability without the use of
k factors for combining general application stresses and without the need for
several assumptions such as screening status and constancy of failure .mode
distribution with time. Until this advanced more basic technique can be
perfected, it will be po ssible to make approximate hybrid predictions using
the Hughes Interim Hybrid Prediction Technique. This is an improved form
of the integrated circuit technique released by Hughes in the 1967 updating of
the RADC Reliability Notebook. It is based on an interim type model involving
a base failure rate Ab that is a function of the design, structure and process,
modified by a series of 7T product terms. This Hughe s Hybrid Failure Rate
Model is
where:
7TE is an environmental factor found from a convenient table.
7TT is the base or junction temperature factor formed from a plotted
curve
7TQ is a quality modifier chosen from a table to reflect the screening
conditions and procurement specification requirement s.
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~b = As Asub + As AC + N pC ApC + ApFTTPF +LN RT ART
+ ~ADC N DC + ~ACp N cp
As Asub = the hybrid circuit substrate failure rate and is computed
as 0.001 percent/lOOO hours tiITlesthe area of the substrate
in square inches. If the actual area of the substrate is
unknown, use 50 percent of the external package area or
0.2 inch less than diITlensions, whichever is greater, to
cOITlpute the area of the substrate.
A A = the failure rate contribution due to the network complexity.
s c
The values are found in Figure 26 (appendix B) as a func-
tion of the nUITlber of separate conductive areas (resistors
and conductive paths plus the nUITlber of interconnect wires)
per square inch of substrate. As SUITle two interconnect
wires for each transistor chip, one for each diode chip, and
one for each external connection for rcs unless details to the
contrary are available.
N PC ApC = the number of screen and fire cycle s required to form the
thick film pattern on the sub strate or the number of ma sk-
etch cycles required to form the thin film network pattern on
the substrate tiITles 0.004 percent/l 000 hours which is the
failure rate term for each cycle used in manufacturing the
hybrid. If number of cycles is unknown, as sume three cycles.
ApF TTpF = the hybrid mic rocircuit package failure rate which is a
function of the package style or configuration and the
materials used in its construction.
where:
ApF = O. 002 percent/ 1000 hour s (a normalized value of base
failure rate for all hybrid microcircuit packages).
TTpF = an adjustment factor that modifies ApF as a function
of the package style and the materials used in its con-
struction. The values of TTpF are tabulated in Table 65
(appendix B) for various combinations of style and
material.
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~NRT>-"RT = the sum of the additive failure rates for each resistor
as a function of the required re sistance tolerance.
N
RT
= the nUlTIber of filITl resistors of a given tolerance.
>-"RT = the failure rate to be used for each resistor of a given
tolerance as specified in Table 66 (appendix B).
L:>-"DC N DC = the sum of the discrete chip device failure rates for
semiconductor, IC and capacitor chips, The failure rate
is computed as shown in Table 67 (appendix B),
2:>-" N = the sum of the failure rate s of the conventionally packaged
cp cp
devices used in construction of the hybrid microcircuit
(glass packaged diodes, molded resistors or capacitors).
Until more information is available chip resistors should
be treated as their equivalent in leaded discrete devices.
The failure rate is obtained by computing the failure rate
in the normal manner at 25 0 C, excluding the environmental
factors rr E and 2: E ,
Note: This Hughes Interim Hybrid Prediction Technique is explained in
detail with application example s in Appendix B,
Proof of the success of this interim modeling prediction technique is
the results obtained on the F-14XN3 program. There are 545 Hughes hybrids
used in each of the XN3 systems, To date these systems have logged in excess
of 3, 700, 000 hybrid device hours in approximately 4600 system hours. A
decreasing failure rate was observed with time, During the first 1600 hours,
17 failure s occurred yielding a failure rate of 2 percent per 1000 hour s, In
the next 3000 hours, nine failures were experienced for a failure rate of
approxilTIately 0.5 percent per thousand hours. Deleting five failures con-
sidered to be non-relevant (lTIisapplication corrected through test or design
lTIodification) the average failure rate achieved during the above 3000 hour
interval cOlTIputes to 0.24 percent per thousand hours. Note that this was
predicted at O. 28 percent last year by us e of the Hughes InterilTI Hybrid pre-
diction technique. Note also that the prelilTIinary gross nUlTIbers used in the
proposed new technique described in Section 2e also netted figures close to
these of 0.36 percent and 0.2 percent per thousand hours for two consecutive
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1000 hour intervals. It is believed that this new technique when finally
perfected will provide for accurate predictions plus direct correlation with
design, factory, process, and screening, control and cost factors. Whereas
the interim. technique predicts the bottom. of the Reliability Bathtub curve
after this has been reached, the new basic m.odeling technique will predict
the failure rate and other related factors for any tim.e interval down to the
bottom. of the reliability bathtub curve and can predict when the bottom. will
be reached.
A third m.odeling technique, developed for NASA Goddard specifically
for use with semiconductor diodes, applies also to hybrid microcircuits later
in life when the combined influence s of temperature, load and radiation cause
a degradation characteristic typical of the conventional wearout portion of the
reliability bathtub curve. This can be explored more fully in a later modeling
effort. The success achieved with this third technique in a controlled experi-
ment further emphasizes the feasibility of the proposed modeling effort. The
two techniques involve compatible models, terminology and failure mode
postulates. They supplement and complement one another and when finally
perfected will permit accurate prediction of total life cycle reliability and
cost for complex microcircuit systems. Additional information on the
feasibility of the wearout models and life cycle co st tradeoffs using the
models can be provided on reque st.
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IV. PREDICTION MODELING THEORY
A. GENERAL
Recent advances in prediction modeling theory now make it feasible to
develop accurate reliability prediction models for us e with LSI microcircuits
and large scale hybrid arrays. Analysis of past modeling efforts in the field
of reliability prediction has revealed error in approach, philos ophy and tech-
nique, and has identified not only the methods of modeling mos t likely to be
succes sful but has revealed pitfalls to be avoided. In particular, a serious
study has been made of the tendency for most mathematical models to be
mathematically rigorous but too complex and unwieldly for practical applica-
tion to complex microcircuit or equipment systems. Major breakthroughs
in theory and approach have resulted. These advances now make it possible
to tradeoff program emphasis at any point on such factors as design goals
and controls on materials and factory operation in response to specific
information on the net result to be expected in terms of total life cycle cost
and achieved reliability at any interval during ma~ufacture and life.
Many of the past problems in reliability have been caused by the "lack"
of proven technological methods and criteria for support of management
decision making. Characteristic of this "lack" has been that for the past
two decades Reliability Engineering has limped along on the strength of only
one "law" of reliability, the so called "law!' of exponential failure probability..
With all its inadequacies, this law has served well within its restricted
meaning and limited s cope of application. But for lack of anything bette r,
most aspects of program control and cost optimization have had to obey
undefined proprietary laws of immediate self interest, approximation by those
not necessarily the best qualified, and individual intuitive judgement often
based on partial facts and incomplete information.
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It is believed that most of the basic technical tools needed for the
economic controlled achievement of specified high system reliability have
now been developed. The detailed definition of the real world paramete rs
that affect cost and reliability achievement makes these tools new and unique.
Another key aspect of this new approach is the formulation of workable mathe-
matical models that provide for specific cost and reliability tradeoffs.
In broad perspective these new models and variant equations are expres-
sions of order, cause and effect derived from past engineering and program
experience. Briefly, they are mathematical patterns of dynamic results,
expressing the interaction and synergistic effects for statistical averages of
aggregate stress, strength, and strain factors reacting against one another
and against inherent activation energy thresholds. In other words, they con-
stitute plausible probability distributions that express composite processes
of nature corresponding to physical observations of stress and failure
phenomena in real time.
During most attempts in the past to model reliability characteristics,
the meaning and impact of the many key or basic stress and strength param-
eters were not defined. Without these definitions, the reliability models
could only show the classic shape of known statistical distributions without
revealing the basic interaction effects in the degradation mechanisms. For
example, it has been possible to show that under certain conditions a Weibull
distribution would fit ce rtain failure data; however, no real insight was pro-
vided into what could be done by management to change the distribution or
relate it to its causative factors. A further illustration is that the shape
parameter f3 of a Weibull cumulative failure probability distribution has never
been recognized as in itself a" measurable function of manufacturing quality,
screening effectiveness, item strength figure of merit, and stress loading. "
When these functions become defined (as they have been recently for many
types of systems, parts and circumstances), the effect on reliability and the
cost of changes in these basic parameters can be predicted. Hence for the
first time it is now possible to relate program plans, conditions, and controls
to reliability results and specific costs.
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The following discus sion includes detailed sys tern and prog ram
application theory in the belief that the feasibility of LSI prediction models
hinges on their applicability and compatibility with the total system procure-
ment and life cost problerns.
B. NEW MODELING APPROA CH
The prim.ary function of m.ath m.odeling is to express the processes of
nature in m.athem.atical form. showing the operational relations between
variable sand param.eters so that apparently diver se and obtusely related
phenom.ena can be understood. A good m.odel will reduce great quantities of
experim.ental data to sim.ple m.athem.atical form. without loss of m.eaning and
with greatly increased visibility of im.portant principles and interactions.
Unfortunately m.ost processes of nature are so com.plicated that it is
frequently im.pos sible to develop tractable m.athem.atical formulae that cor-
respond exactly to the physical reality. Generally, many distinctive
mechanism.s lead to failure m.odes of m.any kinds. When term.s in a m.odel
are generated for each of these m.odes and m.echanism.s, the m.odels becom.e
very com.plex and im.pos sible to solve or use effectively. This is true even
for som.e discrete com.ponents and particularly so for com.plex system.s.
As a result, except for cases of sim.ple system.s involving only one or
two m.aterial interfaces, m.ath models rightfully have earned a reputation of
gene ral im.practicality. All too often the m.odel was either too com.plex to
have practical application or it was a simple explanation of very limited
phenom.ena that were not system oriented.
After years of working with this com.mon approach to m.odeling, it was
recognized that it is a self-frustrating exercise to try to m.odel the degradao-
tion effect of stresses applied to every failure m.echanism. in a system.. A
new approach was needed.
The first major breakthrough came in the definition of "Basic Family
Failure Modes. II The emphasis was shifted from the type of mechanism and'
its final failure mode to comm.on characteristics of response by groups of
mechanisms reacting to the applied stresses. By definition a basic family
mode includes all deg radation and failure mechanisms that can be modeled
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by a common failure dis tribution. In other words, the common respons e
characteristics categorize a basic family mode, not the distinctive nature
of an individual mechanism.
The value of this new approach can be appreciated when the problems
of modeling for complex systems are considered. For example, consider
the case of a microcircuit that is a miniature complex system. The quantity
of distinctive failure mechanisms in LSI microcircuits may exceed several
hundred. A model with several hundred terms is impractical. However,
when it is realized that the response of all several hundred mechanisms can
be modeled by only six or seven different degradation distribution curves,
the concept of basic family modes takes on major significance. All the
mechanisms that react the same way to a set of combined conditions can be
considered as belonging to a common category or basic family mode. The
total system response thus can be modeled successfully using only as many
terms as there are basic family distributions that describe the stress-time
response.
For clarification it can be stated that say 20 percent of the failure
mechanism.s will obey a family mode cumulative failure distribution in
time; another percentage (say 15 percent) will obey a second basic mode
failure distribution in time, etc. Such a model containing six or seven
terms can be validated in simple (economic) tests and then applied easily for
practical program control. Other guidelines, such as recognition of the
differences between the effect of stresses on chemical properties and micro-
structure and their effects on mechanical properties and macrostructu re,
simplified the derivation and application of the new models and laws.
From such derivation and with proof by empirical fit to various pro-
gram data, a total of eight different series of models have been developed
relating to a dozen or more useful new reliability" Laws". Many other
related equations representing different forms or variations of the Law rela-
tionships are also helpful for making specific computations and for revealing
stre s s- strength inte ractions. These models and equations represent a con-
tinuous theory relating the physical chemistry of composite materials and
their applied dynamics in complex devices with the device degradation and
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failure characteristics. This continuous theory provides mathematical
bridges between the various reliability concepts that previously could not be
related or expressed in simple and practical mathematical models.
In brief summary, this theory relates to the fact that nearly all
J
materials are unstable with increased temperature and undergo a chemical
breakdown or thermal degradation that obeys a time-rate process. A parallel
fact not generally recognized is that nearly all strength characteristic s in
resistance to any other stress and stress-to-stress synergistic effects also
obey a rate process in the time- stress continuum. Thus all aspects of
strength in time can be related to the specific degrading stresses in a practi-
cal model or algorithm that describe real-life degradation conditions. When
these rate processes for all the interacting stresses and strengths are com-
bined in a model commensurate with the real world combination of physical
conditions and reaction thresholds, a workable engineering characterization
or "Law" results. Probable failure rates, quantities of failure likely to occur
during specific stress intervals, the percent reliability defectives remaining
undetected at any time, and all the other fadors listed in Table X thus can be
clarified and nume rically evaluated as needed by the program controls and
requirements.
Effective cost control derives from the ability to compute specific
changes in numerics of the parameters in response to changes in the condi-
tions described by the models. Since each numeric can be assigned a cost
figure, changes in the conditions can be converted directly to cost changes.
Thus, practical cost-reliability tradeoffs are now possible on a routine com-
putational basis. These may be based on preliminary estimates of probable
numerics or be derived more accurately from subsequent measurement of
actual numerics as the program develops and measurement figures become
available to replace the a-priori estimates.
C. APPLICABILITY OF MODELS
To better understand how the models relate to one another and how they
apply to real world problems, it is helpful to consider the familiar reliability
"Bathtub" curve as shown in Figure 17. This curve, plotting failure rate with
time, was first derived by Mr. Ryerson in 1954 from actual factory and field
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A.
TABLE X. THEORY AND MODEL RELATED
RELIABILITY SUBJECTS
Figures of Merit
Failure Rate
Meantime between failures
Meantime to failure
Meantime to lot failure
Probability of Survival
Probability of Failure
Cumulative Failure Distribution
.Failure Hazard
Detection Efficiency
Percent Reliability Defective
Percent Quality Defective
Distribution Shaping Parameter
Quantity of Failures
Quantity of repetitive stresses
Hours between measurements
Inspector Judgment
Worker generated Defects
Process generated Defects
Inte rval Yield
Potential Yield
Apparent Yield
Real Yield
>..
MTBF
MTTF
fJ-A
Ps
P f
F(t)
Z
D
q
Q
(3
ljJ
h
J
B. Burn-in (Part, Unit, System, etc.)
C. Conditioning (powe red and unpowe red)
D. Infant Mortality (needed time and s tres s impact)
E. Normal (Poisson) Operating Period
F. Longevity and Wearout
G. Degrading Stresses
H. Reliability Screening
1. Reliability Growth
J. Risk and Confidence
K. Reliabili ty Tes ting
Qualification
Acceptance
Screening
AGREE
Validating
Repeat Verification
L. Rework Costs
M. Total Life Costs
N. Test Cases
O. Storage Cases
P. Control Effectiveness
4-6
-r
PREDICTED
FROM
HANDBOOKS
NORMAL OPERATING
PERIOD
.SERIESJ - -+.mIE~lHANDBOOK INTERIM)
(BURN-IN AND I •SERIES 2 SEMICONDUCTOR DIODES)
SCREENING) • SERIES 4 RELIABILITY GROWTH)
I •SERIES 6 (ADHESIVE BONDED JOINTS)• SERIES 7 (MSI, LSI, AND ELSIFAILURE RATE)
TIME t
WEAROUT
PERIOD
• SERIES 5
(WEAROUT AND
LONGEVITY)
• SERIES B
(MSI, LSI AND
ELSI LONGEVITY)
Figure 17. Model Correlation to the Reliability
llBathtub" Response Curve
data to show the three different periods in an operating life cycle. The central
or NORMAL OPERATING PERIOD (Figure 17) is characterized as having a
constant or nearly constant failure rate. It is the height of this portion of
the failure rate curve which is predicted from reliability handbooks such
as the RADC Reliability Notebook or MIL-HDBK-217 using Hughes Series 1
(Interim) models. The same failure rate can be predicted more accurately
for semiconductor diodes by considering actual stresses and without the need
for adjustment K factors by using the basic models of Series 2. When other
series of models of the basic type are developed for all the part types, an
entirely different handbook presentation will be possible.
The modeling attention next shifted to the general conditions of screen-
ing and burn-in associated with the INFANT MORTALITY PERIOD. This
period generally has a decreasing failure rate before the time that equipment
and parts have stabilized and failure rates leveled off. The Series 3 models
were developed to relate many newly defined key factors in screening and
burn-in that apply equally well to parts or systems.
The next Series 4 models defined conditions and response related to
Reliability Growth during repeated production. This Series 4 applies at the
NORMAL OPERATING PERIOD of Figure 17 for subsequent equipments of a
given type but relate to the change of failure rate (or its reciprocal the
MTBF) with calendar time after initial production and the unit of production.
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The Series 5 models on wearout and longevity apply particularly to the
WEAROUT PERIOD of Figure 1 for equipments and systems. They also
apply during the NORMAL OPERATING PERIOD to mechanical and electro-
mechanical devices that normally operate with a wearout characteristic.
Indeed for complex systems involving wearout type items, the Series 5
models are key to the time of termination for the normal operating period.
When the potential failure hazard for low population short life items reaches
a critical value, it exceeds the normal level of random or decreasing failure
rate and defines the beginning of the system wearout curve. This longevity
or time to wearout is an important factor in successful preventive
maintenance.
The Series 6 models on adhesive bonded joints have certain similarities
to the Series 5 models but relate to the fatigue strength or wearout of complex
adhesive bonded structures under repetitive stresses. For mechanical adhe-
sive bonded structures, these Series 6 models predict conditions and time to
malfunction or failure rate in time under cyclic stresses. Thus for these
structures, the Series 6 models apply to the normal operating period.
In this same frame of reference, the Series 7 models will apply to the
constant failure rate portion in the life of LSI and MSI microcircuits similar
to the coverage of the Series 2 basic models for semiconductor diodes. The
Series 8 models will describe longevity and long life characteristics of MSI
and LSI similar to the coverage of the Series 5 models for mechanical and
electro-mechanical devices. These last two model series will be most
helpful for designing reliable long-life unattended spacecraft. It is believed
that with only minor modification, if any, these same models Se ries 7 and 8
will apply with equal accuracy to the new extra large scale integrated circuits
ELSI. Note that normal wearout of microcircuits occurs so long delayed in
time as to be a negligible consideration. This is not true, however, when
high energy radiation fields are present. Under these stress conditions, all
semi- conductor device s exhibit a degradation with time that has wearout
characte ristic s.
It is impos sible to illustrate and explain all the se models in this report
but a few examples are given in the next section.
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D. MODEL APPLICA TION EXAMPLES
Example 1.
Given the Model:
1 - P
s (1 )
This model is useful to the contractor for interpreting the P
s
(probability of survival) requirement imposed by his contract. This require-
ment might state that the product must demonstrate an 80-percent probability
of survival during a specified AGREE or MIL-STD-78l demonstration test.
Suppose the equipment in question has a complexity factor N = 2000 parts
and suppose also from a study of the type of equipment and measurements
planned for the demonstration test, the detection efficiency is estimated to be
a typical value of D. = 75 percent. The remaining unknowns in the above
1
given model are the values of F that are the screening strength total inherent
s
in the manufacturing operation and qOi which is the fraction reliability defec-
tive required of the equipment at the start of the test interval if the demon-
strated probability of survival is to meet the 75 percent requirement.
To find the value of F for the given acceptance test, another model
s
must be used. To simplify this example, it is as sumed that the environmental
and load stress profile of the demonstration test is analyzed and found to have
a typical (moderate) value of F = 2.5. By substituting these values into the
s
given model the value of qOi' which is the facto ry goal, can be computed:
1 - 0.8·
(2,000)(0.75) (
1 __1 )
2.5
= ~o~ = 0.00022 or O. 022 percent
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This computation says that if the equipment is to pass the specified test
with the specified probability of survival it must contain no more than 0.022
percent reliability defectives at the end of the manufacturing operation and
just before entering the demonstration te st. Anothe r simple model give s a
further inte rpretation:
F
m
(2 )
This model states that the screening strength needed during manufacturing
F (if the detection efficiency is 100 percent) is equal to the ratio between the
m
incoming fraction reliability defective and the final required outgoing fraction
reliability defective. Since the outgoing qt is the same as the incoming qo' of
. 1
the following demonstration test, then this second model becomes:
F
qo
= =
m qo.
1
qo (%)
O. 022 (%) (3)
By experience with other programs it is known that if parts are pro-
cured to good specifications with screening requirements similar to level B
of MIL-STD-883, an average incoming level to manufacturing can be
q = 1. 0 percent.
o
Thus the screening strength required during the manufacturing cycle
can be computed:
F
m
1%
= = 45o. 022%
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(4 )
Now it is also known that the typical manufacturing cycle has an
inherent F of less than 10. Thus if special measures are not taken during
s
manufacturing to increase the inherent F , there will be no chance of passing
. s
the required demonstration test. The exact probability of survival if no
special measures are taken and the actual factory screening strength is
as sumed to be F = 10 can be computed from the given models as follows:
m
F
qo
=
m qt
q
0 (5 )qt =y- = qo.
m 1
=
1%
= 0.1%qo. 101
and by rearranging equation (1):
p
s = 1 - N D. q (1 - .....!..)1 o. F
1 S
(6)
and substituting the known values for the demonstration test:
P s = 1 - (2000)(0.75)(0.001) (1 - /5) = 1 - ~. 9 = 100/,
In other words in the given example where the required probability of
survival is 80 percent, the contractor must take special screening precautions
if his probability of survival in the specified demonstration is to be higher
than 10 percent.
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The question is what measures can he take to upgrade his operation so
that his product can pass the required demonstration test. Note that the F m
factors in his plant are multipliers. Thus if he introduces additional screen-
ing tests at any stage of his manufacturing with time- stress severity of F f'
he can raise the as sumed F value to the required F = 45 as follows:
m m
Required F m 45
F f = -:A-s-s-u-m-e-::d-F=-~ =10 = 4. 5
m
(7)
Such a screening test is not difficult to provide and may consist of only
temperature cycling if the predominant failure modes constituting his incom-
ing average q = 1. 0 percent are not current and voltage sensitive.
o
Example 2
Given the previous example which requires a contractor to apply special
screening tests having an effective F = 4.5, determine the optimum cost-
s
effective point in his operation for this screening.
Assume for this computation that it costs a manufacturer $10 to replace
a failed part at the assembled card level and $500 to replace the same part if
it fails at the system test level. The problem then is one of computing the
quantity of failures that will occur per each system-quantity of parts during
the special screening tests. Again for simplification assume that detection
efficiency D = 100 pe rcent and the problem can be solved using othe r simple
models as follows.
The quantity of failure occurring during a screening test in M f is
M f = (Fraction Defective Failing) x (Total Quantity)
(8 )
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The cost of screening is thus the cost of replacing each part times the
number of parts failing during the screening test. If the screening test is
applied at the system level where the cost of replacement is $500 per failure
the total cost of screening per system is
Total Screening Cost = ($/t) x (qos - qt
s
) x N
Costs = (500)(0.001 - 0.00022)\2000) = $780/system
At the early assembly or card conditioning level the cost of screening
per system is
Cost = (10)(0.01 - 0.0022)(2000) = $156/system
c
c
Many factors affect this final figure, but each factor can be assessed
independently and solved in a manner similar to that shown in Table XI
Note that many simplifying assumptions were made in these examples
to illustrate the approach. In an actual case more complex models account
for such factors as detection efficiency, worker effectivene ss, and proces s
efficiency not being 100 percent. These and other factors are explained easily
in the available models.
CASE A INCOMINC PARTS NORMAL MANUFACTURE ONL Y DEMONSTRATIONTEST
go 0.01 Fm 10 g,
go
- 0.001 qOj P .. 10%F 5
m
CASE B NORMAL MANUFACTURE SYSTEM TEST SCREENING
F .. 10 F ~ 4.5
m 55
go " 0.01 g, = 0.01 - 0.001 \ = ~••~01 = 0.00022 P - 80%
m 10 5
COST OF SCREENING: (500) (0.001 - 0.00022) (2,000) - S780/SYSTEM
CASE C CARD CONDITIONING NORMAL MANUFACTURESCREENING
F = 4.5 F -10
c
5
m
go - 0.01
- 0.01 0.0022 P 80%g, g, : 0.0022 - 0.00022 5
c 4.5 m 10
COST OF?CREENING = (10) (0.01 - 0.0022),(2.000) - SI56/SYSTEM
Figure 18. Cost Tradeoff Comparison
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E. PROGRAM CONTROL USING THE MODELS
It may not be obvious from the previous discus sion how the new models
constitute powerful tools for system program control and cost tradeoff. It is
important to recognize that all the parameters are defined so that they can be
quantified using actual design, factory, field, and related statistics. Detailed
cost data are included so that every step of computation, repre senting
a finite step in a program, can be cost analyzed. Thus, any phase or
step of a program can be represented either with assumed or actual
data to make effective cost tradeoffs and to plan economic program control's
for optimized expenditures. Also at each computation point the reliability
impact is easily derived for both the immediate set of conditions and condi-
tions likely to exist further downstream in the product life cycle. Thus the
models provide direct correlation between plans, actual circumstances, and
probable future occurrences for both cost and reliability.
In brief, the models represent a practical bridge between the specialty
fields of product effectiveness, value engineering, quality assurance, and
reliability. It might be obvious also that the implementation of the models
could be described truthfully as advanced production engineering.
An immediate benefit of this modeling approach is the clarification it
provides concerning the areas of program and factory control that should be
documented more accurately and what specific data should be correlated and
analyzed. Means are established for achieving optimized factory cost trade-
offs with specific control measures based on actual data from each process
step. Finally the models provide procedures and guides for making better
use of presently existing manufacturing data and its related processing and
interpretation methods and instrumentation.
Specific applications of the modeling method can be related to different
phases of a program life cycle as follows:
1. Early in the system planning, accurate definition of the key or
critical program parameters provides guidance to preliminary
planning and reveals the emphasis and priority needed on various
controls to achieve a specified result.
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2. Using an approximate set of assumed parameter values, early
program plans can include a preliminary set of cost allocations
and standards that should achieve a specified system reliability
at a known minimum cost.
3. The impact of any potential set of program changes can be esti-
mated accurately in advance to provide optimum direction to
program controls and to establish program priorities.
4. As the program progresses, the preliminary assumed data can
be replaced in the models with actual measured facts. The impa'ct
of any serious descrepancies between the original assumed and
the actual data can be re-evaluated frequently to provide guidance
for any neces sary changes in program controls or objectives.
5. As the program progresses, the effectiveness and results from
the controls and actions can be used to assess the need for improve-
ments in the methods of planning and preliminary estimating.
6. From the start of the modeling effort on any program, benefits
will arise from establishing numerical ratings for factors now
controlled only intuitively or not at all.
7. During design stages, details of optimum manufacturing controls
can be worked out from the models and specific methods devised
for integrating with supplier and subcontractor control
programs.
8. During the manufacturing phases the effects of program controls
can be evaluated and reflected in process and other program
changes and in improved methods for corrective action, data
handling, rating of workmanship, understanding process limi-
tations, and in improving quality control methods, inspection
efficiency, and in reducing defect escapes during acceptance.
9. As completed assemblies and systems are tested and evaluated,
the program predictions can be updated for the impact on final
product achievement in Demonstration, Service Te st, and Field
Use. Also final adjustments to the modeling parameters can be
made for use in subsequent applications and other programs.
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10. The usual system program life cycle is a true stochastic series.
Thus, the conditions and facts that exist at any step or interval
during the life cycle are directly dependent on the events and
conditions that transpired previously. Without well planned and
executed program controls, the reliability and cost progres s
during the life cycle are also stochastic in the sense of random
progress. Thus it is fruitless to even consider realistic cost
tradeoffs and optimum cost of high reliability on the typical
system program. The advantage of the control approach
described herein is that the modeling tools have the power of
freezing the random character of the stochastic events. If
program controls are exercised according to parameters in
the models, the life cycle events become deterministic and obey
the "laws" of the models.
The implications that result are summarized below:
1. The models enable the program manager and his assistants to
determine what factors should be controlled and how.
2. The deterministic models reveal what starting points and operat-
ing policies must be established. These are based on an exercise
starting with the required final reliability and cost result that must
be achieved on a program and a knowledge of what has been or
can be controlled in a contra~tor 1 s operation.
3. Intermediate milestones and related program status can be
defined from the models based on the computed starting points
and op~rating policies.
4. The planned program controls according to the models should
result in specific achievements of cost, reliability, and program
progress trends at precomputed milestones.
5. Actual measurement of cumulative cost, reliability, status, and
progress trends at any milestone will confirm the status as
originally predicted for that step if the program controls truly
complied with the conditions originally as sumed for the models.
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6. If the measured status at any milestone does not conform to the
predicted status, a flag is raised for program management.
Specific corrective action steps are pos sible and can again be
, optimized by utilizing other models.
7. An analysis of the reasons why the measured status does not
conform to the predicted will reveal one or more of the following
causes which then can be corrected by suitable management
action:
a. The program controls exercised did not follow the conditions
as sumed for the model at the time of the original prediction.
Increased effort or " patch- up" efforts are indicated.
b. Some of the parameter values assumed were erroneous or
were not constant up to the time of the div~rgentmilestone.
The optimum corrective action here may include changing
the parameter values or changing the controls so that sub-
sequent predictions and related actual measurements will
converge with the determined optimum status.
c. Defective lots of parts or subcontract supplies did not comply
with the expected status. Direct action with the supplie rs is
indicated in this case.
d. Workmanship and process efficiency or inspection effective-
ness did not measure up to the expected values. The specific
steps involved in the optimum corrective action include
training the operators and inspectors, improving process
control, increasing the strength or le'ngth of screening tests,
etc., according to the results from a direct investigation of
the causes and seriousnes s of the deviation from the predicted
status.
8. In addition to providing for suitable corrective program action, the
flag raised called for an investigation to enable management to assess
prog ram prio rities and the seriousnes s of prog ram deviation from
the predicted. In some cases, serious trouble at a later step can be
prevented by keeping the customer and other interested parties
advised of current difficulties. Therefore, it can be seen that the
time-span between prediction milestones should not be long to
enable detection of early deviation trends befo re they become la rge.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
This study has determined the feasibility of developing and verifying
the validity of "basic" type prediction models for use with LSI microcircuits.
It is recommended that this work be accomplished in three steps as follows:
1. Model Development
a. Define specific modeling guides, postulates and first and
second order simplifying as sumptions needed for making the
models practical and easy to use.
b. Define the basic "family modes" which must be repre sented in
the model to describe true-life degradation conditions.
c. Estimate the probable ranges and limits for each of the major
factors and model terms.
d. Develop mathematical relations suitable for use as terms in the
model based on the conditions and as sumptions for each of the
key factors and inter-action effects. These shall incorporate
all the phenomena and failure mode and mechanism effects
revealed by this feasibility study.
e. Generate preliminary general equations relating all the key
factors.
£. Exercise the general equations to demonstrate their practical
use in hypothetical cases by using typical data as developed
during this feasibility study.
2. Model Validation
a. Expand the preliminary general equations into detailed variant
models for specific applications and conditions.
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b. Design and perform test experiments and data research needed
to establish the numerical values of the model parameters for
specific device s. and conditions.
c. Select a restricted typical generic family of microcircuit as
used in a realistic application for illustration purposes. This
could be a common type of Hybrid LSI as used in an airborne
environment.
d. Demonstrate a practical application of the variant models for
the selected device using input data as summarized during the
feasibility study.
e. Design a practical test experiment to verify the assigned
parameter values or to provide input information for necessary
corrections to the models. This experiment plan shall include
a detailec: test specification with tentative contents as follows:
(I) Design of part type to be tested
(2) Test conditions and duration
(3) Quantities of samples involved
(4) Instrumentation requirements
(5) Data Requirements
• Data to be re corded
• Methods of recording, handling, analyzing etc.
• Interpretation and reporting
(6) Failure modes to be expected
(7) Types and quantities of failures expected (based on
exercise of the models)
(8) Discussion of expected results
3. Model Verification
This project phase will involve an extensive program of test veri-
fication according to the test specification developed during the
validation phase. A suitable quantity of test specimens will be
manufactured and tested to establish statistical confidence in the
accuracy of the prediction models and methods.
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APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF THE SCREENING
STRENGTH MODEL (F )
s
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Starting with a consideration of the number of failures to be expected
dUring an interval of time involving some combination of environmental and
loading stresses:
Number of failures f - Fraction Detected x N or
1
rf. = q. N
1 1
But
( 1)
D.
1
(2 )
Therefore
But
D=l qo
q. =
1 F.
1
So
f. = q DoN(l-_l)
1 0 1 F 0
. 1
Solving for F.
1
(3 )
(4)
(5)
F. =
1
1
f.
1 _ 1
q DoN
o 1
A-3
(6)
Now define the number of failures as,
f. = D.N q P f1 1 0
Where:
N q is the total potential number of failures
o
D. is the detection efficiency during the interval
1
P f is the failure probability
Substituting (7) into (6)
(7)
or
Also by rearranging (7)
F. =
1
F. =
1
1
1
P
s
(8)
(9)
and
f.
1
f.
P = 1 _ 1
s D.N q
1 0
(10)
(11 )
Where P is the success probability
s
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From a study of the various environmental (not loading) stre s se s which
can contribute to screening, the three major are:
1. Temperature T (in °C)
2. Temperature Cycling dT/dt (Time rate of change of temperature
in °c per minute)
3. Vibration (in g's rms)
The probability of failure due to these three stresses acting either
separately or in combination is given by:
(12)
Where:
P f is the probability of failure due to tempera ture
T
P f is the probability of failure to time-rate-of-change of temperature
dT
P f is the probability of failure due to vibration
v
But Equation (12) reduces to:
P -f - P s
v
(13 )
Thus the probability of survival becomes:
p
s
and equation (9) becomes:
= 1 - P f = P sT
P
s
v
(14)
F. = P1
ST
1
P
s
v
(15 )
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The individual survival probability functions are illustrated as:
DECREASING
TEMP.
DECREASING
TEMP.
DECREASING
TEMP.
PST P
SdT PSv
(: -~) (,_ ::T) I qv)-------- ~-q:-
0 0 0
--+t --+t --+t
Where each function approaches assymtotically to the lower limit which
IS determined by the fraction of the total q that is screenable by the particu-
o
lar stress involved.
The functions are
(16)
[
-LjJ~ is +s)t -
= qdT e i ,T dT i dTie
qo
(17)
p
s
v
[
-LjJ~(ST+S)t eq ·1' V v.
V 1
= -e
qo
A
TE +273
v
(18)
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or:
=
-lJ;S ~t e
T· se 1 (19)
= (20)
p
s
v
= (21 )
Thus substituting in Equation (15) gives the effective Screening Strength F.
1
for an interval 1:
Where for the case of monolithic microcircuits:
(22)
T E . =
1
T
op.
. 1
. 0
in C (23)
T = L..---':...l-_----I_.....L.. .L-___ in 0 C
EdT. 2
1
(24)
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in °c (25 )
ST = 2. a (for monolithic IC's)
ciT
= (1. a to 4. 5) x cit
(in °C/min)
S = (1. a to 3. 0) x g' sV. rms.
1 1
A = 2298 (for monolithic IC' s )
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(26 )
(27)
(28)
( 29)
APPENDIX B
THE HUGHES INTERIM HYBRID RELIABILITY
PREDICTION TECHNIQUE
(From HAC Designers Reliability Handbook R-67 -3)
This Designers' Handbook contains proprietary information and,
except with written permission 6fHughes Aircraft Company,
such information shall not be published or disclosed to others,
or used for any purpose, and the document shall not be dupli-
cated in whole a r in pa rt pursuant to the Hughes Airc raft
Company Purchase Order, General Provisions, Article 5,
entitled, "Proprieta ry Info rmation, Duplication and Dis clo-
sures." This obligation does not restrict us ear publication of
information obtained independently from unrestricted sources.
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MICROCIRCUITS, HYBRID
Table 61. Prediction Procedure
Part specifications covered
Nonstandard part - no military specification presently exists for hybrid
microcircuits.
Hybrid Failure Rate Model (AH):
AH = Ab (TrE x TrT x TrQ)
where:
an environmental factor from Table 62.
a temperature factor from Figure 24. THE STRESS RATIO IS
THE ACTUAL DISSIPATION DIVIDED BY THE RATING.
TrQ = a quality factor from Table 63.
Ab = base failure rate from the following:
Base Failure Rate Model (Ab)
where:
= As Asub + As AC + NpC ApC + ApF PF + ~NRT ART
+~ADC NDC + ~ACp Ncp
A A
s sub = the hybrid circuit substrate failure rate and is computed
as 0.001%/1000 hours times the area of the substrate in
square inches. If the actual area of the substrate is
unknown. use 50% of the external package area or 0.2" less
than dimensions. whichever is greater, to compute the area
of the substrate.
= the failure rate contribution due to the network complex-
ity. The values are found in Figure 26 as a function of
the number of separate conductive areas (resistors and
conductive paths plus the number of interconnect wires)
per square inch of substrate. Assume 2 interconnect wires
for each transistor chip, one for each diode chip, and one
for each external connection for ICs unless details to the
contrary are available.
R-67-3
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MICROCIRCUITS, HYBRID (continued)
Table 61. Prediction Procedure (continued)
the number of screen and fire cycles required to form the
thick film pattern on the substrate or the number of
mask-etch cycles required to form the thin film network
pattern on the substrate times .0004%/1000 hours which is
the failure rate term for each cycle used in manufacturing
the hybrid. If number of cycles is unknown, assume 3
cycles.
The hybrid microcircuit package failure rate which is a
function of the package style or configuration and the
materials used in its construction.
where:
= 0.002%/1000 hours. This is a normalized value of
base failure rate for all hybrid microcircuit
packages.
is an adjustment factor which modifies A. pF as a
function of the package style and the materials
used in its construction. The values of TIpF are
tabulated in Table 65 for various combinations of
style and material.
the sum of the additive failure rates for each resistor
as a function of the required resistance tolerance.
is the number of film resistors of a given tolerance.
is the failure rate to be used for each resistor of a
given tolerance as specified in Table 66.
the sum of the discrete chip device failure rates for
semiconductor, Ie and capacitor chips. The failure rate
is computed as shown in Table 67.
the sum of the failure rates of the conventionally pack-
aged devices used in construction of the hybrid micro-
circuit (glass packaged diodes, molded resistors or
capacitors). Until more information is available chip
resistors should be treated as their equivalent in leaded
discrete devices. The failure rate is obtained by
computing the failure rate in the normal manner at 25 0 C,
excluding the environmental factors TIE and ~E'
R-67-3
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Figure 25 TIT - Temperature Factor for Thick Film and Thin Film Hybrid Circuits
Note: The values of TIT obtained from the above curve using heat sink temperature is
suitable for hybrid circuits which have less than 200 C temperature rise from heat sink
to hot spot or junction. This covers the majority of hybrid circuit designs. Where
temperature rise is present due to high chip or total hybrid power dissipation or high
thermal resistance from the hybrid to heat sink, a more detailed evaluation is required.
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Figure 26 AC Complexity Term for Thick,
and Thin, Film Hybrid Circuits
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Table 62.
MICROCIRCUITS, HYBRID
TIF. t Environmental Factor Based on Environmental
Service Condition.
Envi ronmen t Symbol TIE
Space Flight Sf 1.5
Ground Fixed Gf 2.0
Airborne t Inhabited A. 5.0
1.
Naval t Sheltered N 6.0s
Ground t Mobile G 7.0m
Naval t Unsheltered N 7.0u
Airborne t Uninhabited A 7.0
u
Satellite t Launch Sl 8.0
Missile t Launch Ml 10.0
Table 63. TI Qt Quali ty Factor
Specification
Control Level A B C D
TI Q 0.2 0.4 1.0 4.0
Refer to the Detailed Stress Analysis Section for
a description of Control Levels. If no level is
specified then the TIQ for the C Level must be used.
R-67-3
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Table 64.
MICROCIRCUITS, HYBRID
Adjustment Factor, 7T PF' for Hybrid
llicrocircuit Package Failure Rate
Type of Package
F1atpack
Kovar, Solid
Other Heta1
1--_." _j,:::j.uIlli D.~ .
, Dual In1ine
,..------------- -_.__.__ ..
TO-5
Kovar Header
Gl.qss Header
Axial Lead Packs
l1eta1
7T
PF
1.5
2.0
2.0
L • .J
.-----_._--_._-.------_._---~
1.0
1.2
1.0
Table 65. Failure Rate ART' for Hybrid Network Thick
and Thin Film Resistors versus Resistor
Tolerance
Resistor Failure Rate ATRResistor (Percent/1000 hrs)
Tolerance
(2=. Percent) Thin Film Thick Film
Resistors Resistors
0.1 to <1.0 0.000050 ---
l.0 to < 2.0 0.000025 0.000050
2.0 to <5.0 0.000020 0.000030
5.0 to <10.0 0.000015 0.000020
> 10.0 0.000005 0.000005
R-67-3
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MICROCIRCUITS, HYBRID
AVC ' Failure Rate for Discrete Device (Chips) When Used
in Hybrid Microcircuits
ADC Failure Rate (Percent/1000 hrs)
Discrete Chip Description
Capacitors
!)iodes
Si Low-Power Switching
Si General Purpose
Si Rectifiers
Ge Switching
Ge Rectifiers
Zener
Varactor
Tunnel
Transis tors
Si Low-Power Switching
Si General Purpose
Si Power> 1. 0 Watt
Ge Low-Power Switching
Ge General Purpose
Ge Power> 1. 0 Watt
FET
Unijunction
Silicon Controlled
Rectifiers (SCR)
Low Power <1. 0 amp
Power ~ 1. 0 amp
Monolithic Integrated Circuits
-Bonded Wire
Lead (Face-Up)
Devices
0.00015
0.00025
0.00045
0.00100
0.00200
0.00030
0.00200
0.00200
0.0003
0.0005
0.0033
0.0007
0.0013
0.0050
0.0012
0.0060
0.001
0.004
"Flip-Chips",
Bumped, Beam,
Lead, or Tab
Lead Devices
.0005
0.00020
0.00030
0.00050
0.00100
0.00200
0.00035
0.00200
0.00200
0.0004
0.0006
0.0033
0.0008
0.0013
0.0060
0.0015
0.0065
0.0012
0.0050
The base failure rate of .0012%/1000 hours is multiplied by the
complexity factor from Table 67 and 68.
R-67-3
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Tab Ie 67. TIc' Complexity Factor for Liigital Hicrocircuit Chips
Input uescription
(Per Function)Logic
------------------i------------------r-----------,
I
Basic Single Gate
.duffer
up to 4 inputs
I input
1.0
Single Gate
Dual Gate
J:.:xpander
NAJ.'W/NOR Gate
MlJ/OR Gate
vual Inverter
4 to 8 inputs
up to 4 inputs
up to 5 inputs
up to 5 inputs
up to 5 inputs
any
Triple Gate
Exclusive OR Gate
Triple NAND Gate
Triple J.~A!'W/HOR Gate
l~lu'-JlJ/1WR with Emit ter
Follower
Adder
up to 4 inputs
up to 4 inputs
up to 3 inputs
up to 3 inputs
up to 6 inputs
any
1.5
Quad Gate
JJual Expander
Dual N&~u/NOR Gate
Quad Inverter lJriver
Triple NAJ.'W/.'-lOR with
Emitter Follower
up to 4 inputs
up to 4 inputs
up to 5 inputs
any
up to 4 inputs
2.0
Simple Flip-Flop
Pulse Exclusive-OR
2 inputs
any
2.5
JJ{ Flip-Flop wi til
Preset AND/OR Clear
vual Exclusive-OR Gate
One-Shot Hultivibrator
any
up to 4 inputs
3.0
5.0
any
any
any
any
Dual JK Flip-Flop Witll
Preset AJ.~lJ/OR Clear
Shift Kegister
J1\./ l~-S F1 ip-Flop
Quad :'-J).,i'JlJ /NOR
I
1--v-u-a-l--S-i-m-p-I-e-F-I-1-'P-_-F-I-O-P----r.---2-i-n-p-u-t-s-------+---4-.-0------1
1
1<'-S Fl ip-Flop/Coun ter any
Ri pp Ie Coun te rs any
~---------------+------------+--------j
I
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Table 68. TIc' Complexity Factor for Linear Microcircuit Chips
Characteristic Complexity Factor TIC
For each simple or basic function 10.0
10.0
(
open-circuit voltage gain\
in db above 60 db )
For open-circuit voltage gains over
60 db of each basic function
For each extra or special input
(such as noninverting, etc.)
2.0
For each extra or special output
(such as emitter follower)
2.0
For each other special feature
(such as threshold limiting or
extreme frequency response)
3.0
Note: Obtain the total TIC for linear microcircuits by adding
appropriate factors from this table.
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EXAMPLE:
Determining the Failure Rate of a Hybrid Microcircuit
Given: A thin film substrate (0.656 sq. in.) containing 2 transistors and
2 diodes (silicon, general purpose, bonded base down), 4 transistors (silicon >1.0
watt) of the flip-chip design, 2 micro-discrete capacitors, 8 resistors with a
tolerance of 5 percent and 25 separate conducting paths. It will be packaged in a
glass frit flat pack, operating at a temperature of 650 C in a Ground Mobile service
environment. Three mask-etch cycles are required to produce the conductive paths
and resistor elements. The circuit dissipates 40% of the package rating.
Find: The failure rate of the microcircuit.
Step 1. As A
sub substrate failure rate from Table 61
Step 2.
A' = .001 x .656 = .000656 %/1000 hourss J\.sub
A A network complexity factor from Figure 26
s c.
element density = 49/ .656 = 75 A .0015
c
A A
s c
.656 x .0015 = .000985 %/1000 hours
Step 3. N A ,screen/fire, mask/etch failure rate is found in Table 61pc pc
and is .0004 x No. of mask/etch cycles
Npc ApC = .0012 %/1000 hours
Step 4. , package failure rate is found in Table 61 and equals
"-pF TTpF '
ApF TTpF = .002 x 2.0 = .004 %/1000 hours
Step 5. ~NRT ART Additive resistor failure rates is found in Table 65
,
~NRT ART = 8 x .000015 = .0012 %/1000 hours
Step 6. ~ADCNDC' the discrete chip failure rate is found in Table 66
~A N = 4 x .0005 + 2 x .0005 + 2 x .00025DC DC
.0132 + .001 + .0005 = .0157 %/1000 hours
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EXAMPLE: MICROCIRCUITS, HYBRID (continued)
EXAMPLE:
Step 7. 2: A N the sum of failure rates for discrete devices would be found in
cp cp
the other sections of this handbook. For this device
:E;\ N = 0
cp cp
Step 8.Ab the base failure rate is the sum of the preceding failure rates
Ab = .00065 + .000985 + .0012 + .003 + .00012 + .0157
= .02265 %/1000 hours
Step 9. The overall failure rate
AH = Ab (TTE x TTT x TTQ)
TT from Table 62 = 7.0E
ITT from Figure 25 = 2.5
from Table 63 for C level = 1TT Q
AH .02265 (7 x 2.5 x 1) = .396 %/1000 hours
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